Abstract
Introduction
Despite of the fact the role of institutions in shaping economic history has given significant importance but the empirical literature focusing on the concept of institutions is not adequate in social sciences 3 . The contributors to the voluminous descriptive literature on institutions are, Olson (1982) , Baumol (1990) , North (1990) . They defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, -the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction‖. These rules of the game can be in the form of formal institutions like laws and regulations or informal ones which assimilated to culture or social capital (Tabellini 2005 , Putnam 1993 ). Some institutions lowers transaction cost thereby result in innovation and productivity whereas other institutional features impedes information flow, raising information costs and eroding the gains from information, and limits the entrepreneurial activity. Examples of the institutions that stunt economic growth include government, police, court corruption, excessive taxation and regulation, unstable inconsistent monetary and fiscal policy. (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan, Woodruff, 1999 Lawson, 1998, 1999; Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Vishney, 1993, 1994; Soto, 1989 Soto, , 2000 .
The relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic institutions has emerged recently as a major subject of interest. The literature shows that the higher the quality of domestic institutions the better the effects on the Human development and growth of a country. The causality between institutions and economic performance is also important issue and studies shows better institutions leads to a higher income rather than causation being in the opposite direction. However most of the empirical evidence about the relationship between institutions and growth are based on cross-sectional and cross-country analysis. Quite apart from general methodological flaws relating to model specification and econometric procedure, there are two fundamental limitations that make results from any cross-country study on the subject rather dubious. First, cross-country regression analysis is based on the implicit assumption of -homogeneity‖ in the observed relationship across countries. This is very restrictive assumption. Secondly, given vast difference among countries with respect to nature and quality of data, cross-country comparison is fraught with danger. These considerations point a need for undertaking econometric analysis of individual countries over time in order to build a sound empirical foundation for informing the policy debate. Furthermore, no attempt to our knowledge has yet been made in this direction for
Pakistan. This paper tries to contribute to the literature in examining the effects of several dimensions of institutions on growth empirically for Pakistan. Since many of these dimensions are highly correlated, it is impossible to include them all individually in one regression. Therefore, the paper develops an index covering its most important aspects. To measure these dimensions, 12 variables have been combined to two subindexes using an objective statistical method. The sub-indexes are in turn aggregated into one single index of institutions. Several other studies attempted to aggregate institutions but this aggregation is based on the institutions' relative importance in economic performance as their authors' sees it, this clearly lacks proper theoretical bases. In this study we tried to aggregate variables to judge Pakistan's institutional quality in a proper theoretical framework.
We take our queue from theoretical framework set by Douglass North (1981, pp. 20-27) .
Who on explaining the roles of institutions, proposes two theories, a -Contract theory‖ of the state and a -Predatory theory‖ of the state. Accordingly, in this study, we attempted to explore these roles through the notion of institutionalized social technologies. The term -social technologies‖ involve patterned human interaction rather than physical engineering, also has been put forth by (North and Wallis 1994; Boserup 1996 and Day and Walter 1987) .
Nelson and Sampat (2001) proposed, not all social technologies are institutions, but rather only those that have become a standard and expected thing to do, given the objectives and the setting. Institutionalized social technologies define low transaction cost ways of doing things that involve human interaction. Hence in effectively institutionalized social technologies, individuals capture the social returns to their actions as private returns North and Thomas (1973) . It protects the output of individual productive units from diversion and also resolves the problem of asymmetric information as it develop mutual trust among agents. Whereas ineffective institutionalized social technology will not only increase the risk but also divert economic agents from innovative activities to seeking rents. Accordingly Our index of institutionalized social technologies is divided into Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies.
Paper is organized as follows section 1 introduction, section 2 covers review of literature, section 3 covers methodology and rational for index, section 4 Empirical estimates, Section 5
Analysis and Results and Section 6 gives conclusions and recommendations.
Review of Literature
The Contract theory literature, starting with Coase (1937 Coase ( , 1960 and Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , links the efficiency of organizations and societies to what type of contracts can be written and enforced, and thus underscores the importance of contracting institutions (see also Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; and Hart 1995 Nelson (2007) point out -Societies clearly have a degree of control over institutions like the formal structure of laws, and formal organizational designs and designated authority relationships‖. Baumol (1990) pointed out information asymmetry through rent seeking or organized crime is curbed through strong institutions--so only venue left for competition and dominance is through innovation. Hence in the setting of effective enforcement, these asymmetries will lead to innovation as the only venue left to earn information rents.
First component in our index of institutional technologies is Risk reducing technologies.
Increased risk divert resources from productive activities to protecting there rights. Hall & Jones (1999) showed quantitatively, how important these effects are. Productive activities are vulnerable to predation. As they put it, Social control of diversion has two benefits. First, in a society free of diversion, productive units are rewarded by the full amount of their production, and where there is diversion, on the other hand, it acts like a tax on output. Second and perhaps more important measure of institutional quality is index of anti-rent seeking technologies. As shown earlier, the rent-seeking (behaviour) refers to -the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers‖ (Tollison, 1997) . In other words, rent-seeking is manifested when the bottom-line of its social consequences is negative. Mehlum et al.(2003) explains the notion of destructive creations asserts that it all starts from the breakdown of institutions, generating new opportunities of extracting rents without producing. A vast literature can be found linking entrepreneurship, rent seeking and growth (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Baumol, 1990 Baumol, , 1993 Acemoglu, 1995; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 ) .
There is dearth of literature exploring relationship between institution and economic performance. In particular (Acemoglu et al. 2001 (Acemoglu et al. , 2002 show that quality of institutions have a more important effect on long term growth than on short term one. Jalilian et al. (2007) emphasises the role of regulatory institutional capacity in accounting for crosscountry variations in economic growth Méon and Weill (2006) , Olson et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that institutional factors are strongly related to total factor productivity.
As productivity growth is higher in countries with better institutions and quality of governance.
With regards to causal effect between institutions and economic performance , studies like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Olson et al. 1998; Rodrik et al. 2004; Kauffman et al. 2005, p. 38) , indicates indicate that a better institutions leads to a higher income rather than causation being in the opposite direction. In particular Kauffman suggests that a one standard deviation improvement in governance institutions leads to a two to threefold difference in income levels in the long run. Some studies find that the quality of governance and institutions is important in explaining the rates of investment, as they suggested they effect economic performance through improving the climate for capital creation ( (2000), which shows that while governments under authoritarian rule in Pakistan were good for economic growth, they were not necessarily as successful in improving human endowment. Authoritarian rule normally associated of weak institutions whereas vice versa for democracy.
Methodology and Rational of index.
In this section we focus on index description, data sources, Normalization procedure and lastly weighting and aggregation methodology.
Description of Indices
In this section we define the computation of the following indices.
Index of institutionalized Social Technologies (sci)
Technologies consist of those factors that increase efficiency and productivity. This index measures technologies that are bundle of information that consists of routines and processes imposed by society, which creates positive rents in the economy. These rents are pareto improving and results in Schumpeterian creative destruction, whereas improperly enforced institutional technology creates negative rents doesn't result in increasing return to scale at economy level, but results in mere redistribution of wealth within the economy creating inequality. This is an aggregate cross national index that encompasses the impact of all institutional performance indicators and comprises of Index of Risk Reducing Technologies and the Index of Anti Rent seeking Technologies. (See Table 1 ). property rights insecure for all except those who have power to secure it privately. As a result returns to investment for those people would be considerably more than the rest who bears higher risk due to insecurity. As a result it will divert individuals and businesses from innovative activities to become predictive rent seekers.
Moreover increased risk diverts resources from productive activities to protecting their rights.
As a result it lowers productivity. Rephrasing a bookish example, if a farm cannot be protected from theft, then thievery will be an attractive alternative to farming. A fraction of the labor force will be employed as thieves, making no contribution to output. Farmers will spend more of their time and resources protecting their farms from thieves like they must hire guards and put up fences and consequently grow fewer crops from available resources. In 
Index of Anti-Rent seeking Technologies (Ri)
Predatory rents can be gained through weak institutionalization of risk reducing technologies as explained earlier. However this component exclusively focuses on those rents seeking opportunities that arise due to loopholes in ineffective or week institutions. Rent-seeking is defined as a situation in which an individual or firm makes money by manipulating economic environment rather than by profit making through innovation. Gaps in institutions create rents for controlling agents betting them higher return then though innovation hence society moves from innovative to rent seeking activities. Rent extraction is a strategic substitute for productive activities as improved opportunities of rent extraction leads to higher profits to parasites on the expense of the producers, in short run it will hampers productive investments but in the longer run the profit differential induces a reallocation of entrepreneurs away from production. As production declines and congestion among parasites sets in, both parasites and producers lose profits Usher (1987) . In other words while more efficient producers raise income both for producers and parasites, more efficient parasites lower the income for both.
In short rent seeking does produce rents for predicators but there impact in economy is zero or negative, since resources are not used in increasing the size of the economic pie, but diverted to snatching the bigger piece from others. Specifically, this index focuses on technologies which helps eliminate three kinds of rent. Accordingly it is subdivided into the following components. 1) Bureaucracy Quality 2) Corruption 3) Democratic Accountability 4) executive recruitment 5) Political competition 6) Political rights and 7) civil liberties. Their weights in Index are 18%, 7%, 16%, 15%, 16%, 11%, 17% respectively.
Description of index of institutionalized social technology and its subcomponents are provided in table 1.
Data Sources and Description
Variables used in construction of indices are taken from various data sources. Most prominent is Political risk service's international country risk guide. Since January 1984, the ICRG has been compiling economic, financial, political and composite risk ratings for 90 countries on a monthly basis. The ICRG rating system comprises 22 variables, representing three major components of country risk, namely economic, financial and political. We More specifically first, principal components analysis is used to extract factors (Manly, 1994) . We choose factors that fulfil these considerations: (i) have associated eigenvalues larger than one; (ii) contribute individually to the explanation of overall variance by more than 10%; and (iii) contribute cumulatively to the explanation of the overall variance by more than 60%. Details of extracted factors are provided in table 4. These factors are then rotated in order to minimise the number of individual indicators that have a high loading on the same factor. The idea behind transforming the factorial axes is to obtain a -simpler structure‖ of the factors. Rotation is a standard step in factor analysis -it changes the factor loadings and hence the interpretation of the factors, while leaving unchanged the analytical solutions obtained ex-ante and ex-post the rotation. Weights are then calculated through the square of factor loadings after rotation which represents the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator which is explained by the factor. Similar approach is used by Nicoletti et al., (2000) that is of grouping the individual components with the highest factors loadings into For Aggregation, we employ linear aggregation which is the summation of weighted and normalised individual indicators. 
Weighting and Aggregation methodology.

Empirical Analysis
The aim of the empirical section of the paper is to investigate links between nations' institutional quality and economic growth, using OLS as well as GMM instrumental variable estimation method in order to control for endogeneity. This subsection describes data, the regression specifications and methodology.
Data Description
The dependent variable is the Real GDP per capita in real term. There are two sets of independent variables. First is the institutional variables and send is control variables. We take index of institutionalized social technology, as well as its sub indices of Risk reducing technologies and Anti-rent seeking technologies for measurement of institutional quality.
Dependent and control variable such as total trade are taken from Heston and Summers (2009) whereas other control variables such as Gross domestic savings and Inflation, are taken from World Development Indicators. Table 7 gives detailed information about the variables and their data source. 
Regression Specification
The role of institutions quality in economic performance, is explained by north in -contract theory‖ and a -predatory theory‖ of the state. To assess these roles we used standard growth regression framework which mostly follow growth empirics literature, such as (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992; and Leving and Renelt 1992) .
Y t = β 0 + β 1 I t + β 2 X t + є i
where t is time period є t is the error term. The economic growth y t is measured by GDP per capita in real terms, I t stands for institutional variables, whereas X t is the vector of control variables for other determinants of growth.
Other determinants of growth denoted by X t include variables to control for other factors that influence growth. In most empirical studies, the choices of additional control variables are ad hoc across studies. As one example, the data appendix in lists over 50 possibilities. In our study, we will be using variables pertaining to macroeconomic stability, savings and Openness. Macroeconomic stability factor in growth empirics is normally captured by consumer price inflation. It is expected that higher inflation tends to reduce growth due to a high level of price instability hence could have a negative expected sign. As Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) find that inflation are negatively related to growth. Saving represented by gross domestic saving as % of GDP, is considered a crucial variable of growth equation. With positive expected sign, higher saving leads to higher investment which in turn leads to higher economic growth. The presumption is that higher saving precedes economic growth. In a typical model of economic growth such as the Solow (1956) model, a clear connection is made between saving and economic growth. Romer (1987 Romer ( ,1989 suggests that saving has too large an influence on growth and take this to be evidence for positive externalities from capital accumulation. On the empirical fount, (Modigliani 1970 (Modigliani , 1990 Maddison 1992; and Carroll and Weil 1994) prove robust positive correlation between saving and growth. Another important variable included in our model is trade liberalization. Removal of trade restrictions helps to stabilize the development process by improving efficiency and return economies from distorted factor prices to production frontiers. Moreover, trade openness will improve domestic technology, production process will be more efficient, and hence productivity will rise (Jin, 2000) . Trade liberalization and growth relations may occur through investment, and trade openness may provide greater access to investment goods . Countries that liberalize their external sector and reduce impediments to international trade can experience relatively higher economic growth. It is generally agreed that an open trade regime is crucial for economic growth and development (Sukar and Ramakrishna, 2002) . Desceibtive Statistics of variables used in empirical analysis are shown in Table 8 . 
Estimation Methodology
We will be using OLS as well as GMM procedure in our analysis as there might be the problem of endogenity that could arise in independent variables specifically in institutional variables, as these variables have a strong positive correlation with growth. In literature, depending on the context, GMM has been applied to time series, cross-sectional, and panel data. Inevitably, GMM builds from earlier work, and its most obvious statistical antecedents are method of moments (Pearson, 1893 (Pearson, , 1895 and instrumental variables estimation ( Reiersol 1941; Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982) . The starting point of GMM estimation is a theoretical relation that the parameters should satisfy that is to choose the parameter estimates so that the theoretical relation is satisfied as -closely‖ as possible. The GMM is a robust estimator in that, unlike maximum likelihood estimation, it does not require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances. The theoretical relation that the parameters should satisfy are usually orthogonality conditions between some (possibly nonlinear) function of the parameters ƒ(θ) and a set of instrumental variables z t :
Where θ are the parameters to be estimated. The GMM estimator selects parameter estimates so that the sample correlations between the instruments and the function ƒ are as close to zero as possible, as defined by the criterion function:
Where m(θ)= ƒ(θ)'Z and A is a weighting matrix. Any symmetric positive definite matrix A will yield a consistent estimate of q . However, it can be shown that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to obtain an (asymptotically) efficient estimate is to set A equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the sample moments m .
To apply this methodology, the following equation is estimated by GMM:
The instrumental variables for the equation are twice lags of dependent variable and first lag of all explanatory variables. There are quit a few studies that found inverse link between institution and GDP growth. In a simulation to investigate this link, we regress GDP growth with our index, we found negative significent sign for institutions backing the previous studies, then we employ regression using GDP per capita as a proxy of growth, In our estimation procedure, we employ both OLS and GMM methodology. The estimation results clearly indicate a robust positive impact of institutional variables on growth (Table 10) With some of the variables, there is an obvious endogeneity problem: previous research has shown, that, e.g., if saving increase, it will increase investment and leads to growth, hence it might be endogenous. The same is true for other variables. Endogeneity might even be a problem for our index. To encounter this problem these models are regressed based on GMM methodology. For this, First and Second lags of dependent variable and first lag of all independent variables are used as instruments. In model 4 to 6, Confirming the OLS results, the overall index of institutions and risk reducing index seems to significantly influence growth. there significant level also increased. The signs of other variable also remain same however they became even more significant. Overall the result remains unchanged.
Results and Analysis
Summing up, the overall index of institutionalized social technologies, have a significant (positive) influence on growth. The similar result witnessed in one of its sub index namely risk reducing technologies. However anti-rent seeking technologies remained insignificant.
These institutional indices are also comparable as they all have similar range between 0 and 1. The highest coefficient on our main index clearly depict that both sub indices alone cannot produce as much influence on growth as when they are combined.
Conclusion
The results suggest a strong link between institutional quality and economic growth for
Pakistan. All three measures of institutional quality significantly and positively affect growth.
Moreover our analysis indicate that between the two forms of institutions measured as a subindices of institutionalized social technologies, Risk reducing technologies impact growth considerable more than the Anti-rent seeking technologies. The other control variables shows macroeconomic stability, savings and openness also have significant impact as predicted by theory. On policy front, developing county such as Pakistan or any other country for that matter must make and strengthen their instructions in order to achieve sustainable development. In its absence, even best policies for development and attracting investment might fail as no incentive can balance the huge business risk that could arise if property rights are not secured and contract enforcement is week. Also menses of corruption and nepotism divert any policy incentives given to entrepreneurs towards rent seekers making economy stuck in structural rigidities making any policy ineffective.
